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In a series of articles (Machery et al. 2004, 2009, 2010, forthcoming a, forthcoming b; 
Mallon et al. 2009; Machery and Stich forthcoming), my coauthors and I have provid-
ed evidence that some intuitions about the reference of proper names vary across and 
within cultures, and we have examined the philosophical implications of this variation 
for the development of theories of reference and for those philosophical arguments 
that depend on particular theories of reference. While this body of work has been crit-
icized on various grounds,1 the most influential objection is perhaps that the intuitions 
of lay people are irrelevant, or at least less relevant than the intuitions of experts, to 
determine what the correct theory of reference is. Because to date evidence only sug-
gests that lay people’s intuitions about the reference of proper names vary within and 
across cultures, critics have concluded that, while perhaps interesting in itself, the 
available evidence is of little significance for the development of theories of reference 
and for the philosophical arguments that depend on these theories. While their views 
about the nature of intuitions differ, both Kirk Ludwig (2007) and Michael Devitt 
(2011) have pushed this objection – which I will call “the Expertise Defense.”2 In this 
article, I will assess the Expertise Defense critically, focusing particularly on Devitt’s 
version.3  
 Here is how I will proceed. In Section 1, I will review the available empirical evi-
dence about the variation in intuitions about reference within and across cultures. In 
Section 2, I will describe Devitt’s version of the Expertise Defense. In Section 3, I will 
criticize the Expertise Defense on theoretical grounds. In Section 4, I will present 
some new empirical evidence that expertise about language does not improve the reli-
ability of experts’ intuitions about reference. 
                                                     
* I would like to thank Steven Gross for his comments on a draft of this article. 
1 See, e.g., Ludwig 2007; Martí 2009, forthcoming; Deutsch 2009, 2010; Jackman 2009; Reimer 2009; Lam 
2010; Devitt 2011, 2012; Sytsma and Livengood, 2011; Ichikawa et al. forthcoming; Ostertag ms. 
2 For a more general discussion of expertise and philosophical intuition, see Machery 2011. 
3 For further discussion of Devitt’s (2011) criticisms, see Machery et al. forthcoming b.  
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1. Semantics, Cross-Cultural Style 
1.1 The Method of Cases 
It is important to keep straight the distinction between semantics and metasemantics. 
Philosophers and linguists interested in semantics attempt to determine the semantic 
values of various kinds of words or expressions, such as indexicals, definite descrip-
tions, proper names, etc. – viz. what these kinds of words contribute to the proposi-
tions expressed by the sentences containing them. Philosophers and linguists interest-
ed in metasemantics attempt to explain how various kinds of words (e.g., proper 
names) come to have the semantic values they do have. Theories of reference belong 
squarely to metasemantics: A theory of, e.g., the reference of proper names explains 
how proper names refer to the individuals they refer to. For instance, it would explain 
in virtue of what “Barack Hussein Obama” refers to Barack Obama.  
 Theories of reference can typically be classified into two distinct families: descrip-
tivist and causal-historical theories of reference. In a nutshell, according to descripti-
vist theories of reference, words refer to the entities that satisfy the descriptions asso-
ciated with them. For example, descriptivist theories for the reference of proper 
names claim in substance that proper names are associated with descriptions and that 
they refer to the individuals that satisfy these descriptions (e.g., Searle 1958; Jackson 
1998). By contrast, according to causal-historical theories of reference, words refer to 
the entities they are connected to by a historical chain of uses. For example, causal-
historical theories for the reference of proper names claim in substance that a proper 
name refers to the individual it was introduced to refer to, provided it is historically 
connected to this individual by a history of uses (e.g., Kripke 1972/1980; Devitt 
1981).  
 How do we know which theory of reference is correct? Philosophers of language 
have rarely been explicit about this question, but many of them have embraced the 
following method – which I will call “the method of cases.” Lay people and philoso-
phers alike have intuitions about what words of various kinds – such as proper names 
– refer to in actual and possible situations.4 For instance, people have the intuition 
that in the actual world “Barack Hussein Obama” refers to Barack Obama. Philoso-
phers use these intuitions to assess theories of reference. A theory of reference is un-
dermined if it entails that in an actual or a possible situation a proper name (or a natu-
ral kind term, etc.) refers to what people judge is not its correct reference, and it is 
supported if it entails that in an actual or a possible situation a proper name (or a natu-
ral kind term, etc.) refers to what people judge is its correct reference (the relative im-
portance of actual and possible situations for determining the correct theory of refer-
ence is a matter of controversy, see Devitt 2011; Ichikawa et al. forthcoming; Machery 
et al. forthcoming b).5  
                                                     
4 In the present context, an intuition just is an unreflective judgment.  
5 While widely embraced, the method of cases has been occasionally criticized (e.g., Devitt 1994).  
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 Why would intuitions about reference play such a role? Presumably, for the same 
reason as ordinary judgments are often taken to provide evidence for particular facts. 
If I judge of an object that it is a chair, my judgment that it is a chair is evidence that it 
is a chair because I am reliable at sorting chairs from things that are not chairs (for a 
different perspective, see Jackman 2009). 
1.2 Variation in Intuitions about the Reference of Proper Names 
Ron Mallon, Shaun Nichols, and Steve Stich, and I were interested in finding out 
whether intuitions about reference vary across cultures. Influenced by Nisbett’s cross-
cultural work (e.g., 2003), we hypothesized that people in East Asia (primarily, China, 
Korea, and Japan) would be more likely to have descriptivist intuitions (viz. an intui-
tion in line with descriptivist theories of reference) than Americans. Focusing on 
proper names, we presented participants in Hong-Kong and in the USA with vignettes 
inspired either by Kripke’s Gödel case (Kripke 1972/1980, 83-84) or by Kripke’s Jo-
nah case (Kripke 1972/1980, 67).6 The vignettes were in English, and participants 
were undergraduate students who had little acquaintance with the philosophy of lan-
guage. One of the vignettes inspired by Kripke’s Gödel case read as follows7: 
Suppose that John has learned in college that Gödel is the man who proved an important math-
ematical theorem, called the incompleteness of arithmetic. John is quite good at mathematics and 
he can give an accurate statement of the incompleteness theorem, which he attributes to Gödel as 
the discoverer. But this is the only thing that he has heard about Gödel. Now suppose that Gödel 
was not the author of this theorem. A man called “Schmidt,” whose body was found in Vienna 
under mysterious circumstances many years ago, actually did the work in question. His friend 
Gödel somehow got hold of the manuscript and claimed credit for the work, which was thereaf-
ter attributed to Gödel. Thus, he has been known as the man who proved the incompleteness of 
arithmetic. Most people who have heard the name “Gödel” are like John; the claim that Gödel 
discovered the incompleteness theorem is the only thing they have ever heard about Gödel. 
When John uses the name “Gödel,” is he talking about: 
(A) the person who really discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic? or 
(B) the person who got hold of the manuscript and claimed credit for the work? 
 As predicted, Chinese participants turned out to be more likely to have descripti-
vist intuitions (viz. to answer A) than Americans. In fact, most Chinese participants 
reported a descriptivist intuition, while most Americans reported a Kripkean intuition 
– viz. an intuition in line with causal-historical theories (Figure 1). It would thus seem 
that the intuition elicited by the Gödel case – one of the important cases in Kripke’s 
alleged refutation of descriptivism – varies across cultures (as well as within cultures). 
                                                     
6 The vignettes inspired by the Jonah case are problematic (for discussion, see Machery et al. 2004, B7), 
and I will not discuss them any further here.  
7 The other vignette was structurally similar, but it used a Chinese proper name (“Tsu Ch’ung Chih”) and 
a Chinese story.  
Expertise and Intuitions about Reference 
Theoria 73 (2012): 37-54 
40
Figure 1: Results of Machery et al. (2004) 
 Follow-up work has confirmed these results. Machery et al. (2010) have replicated 
this original study, and have obtained the same results when the probes are presented 
to Hong-Kong participants in Chinese instead of English. Machery et al. (forthcoming 
a) have shown that the cultural difference persists when it is made clear that the ques-
tion at the end of the vignette asks about the reference of the proper name itself (what 
Kripke (1977) called “semantic reference”) instead of whoever it is the speaker intends 
to be talking about. Recently, Sytsma, Livengood, Sato, and Mineki (unpublished data) 
have shown that Japanese participants are also likely to have descriptivist intuitions 
about the reference of “Gödel” in the situation described by the Gödel case. Their re-
sults provide some evidence in support of the cross-cultural hypothesis put forward in 
Machery et al. (2004).  
1.3 Intuitions about the Truth-Value of Sentences 
The studies discussed above focused on people’s intuitions about the reference of 
proper names. In these studies, participants are asked to determine what a proper 
name refers to in the hypothetical situation described by a vignette. In response to 
some criticisms formulated by Martí (2009), Machery et al. (2009) examined whether 
intuitions about the reference of proper names and intuitions about the truth-value of 
sentences containing proper names were in sync with one another. For instance, if 
people tend to have descriptivist intuitions about the reference of “Gödel” in the situ-
ation described by the Gödel case, do they also tend to think that in that situation it is 
true that Gödel was a mathematical genius? To investigate this question, people were 
given either a vignette asking about the reference of a proper name in a hypothetical 
situation or a vignette asking about the truth-value of a sentence containing this name 
in that same situation. Participants were given the Tsu Ch’ung Chih vignette:  
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Ivy is a high school student in Hong Kong. In her astronomy class, she was taught that Tsu 
Ch’ung Chih was the man who first determined the precise time of the summer and winter sol-
stices. But, like all her classmates, this is the only thing she has heard about Tsu Ch’ung Chih. 
Now suppose that Tsu Ch’ung Chih did not really make this discovery. He stole it from an as-
tronomer who died soon after making the discovery. But the theft remained entirely undetected 
and Tsu Ch’ung Chih became famous for the discovery of the precise times of the solstices. Eve-
rybody is like Ivy in this respect; the claim that Tsu Ch’ung Chih determined the solstice times is 
the only thing people have heard about him. 
Then, they were either asked about whom Ivy is talking, or they were asked the fol-
lowing question: 
Having read the above story and accepting that it is true, when Ivy says, “Tsu Ch’ung Chih was a 
great astronomer.” do you think that her claim is: (A) true or (B) false? 
Machery et al. (2009) found that people have consistent intuitions about the reference 
of proper names and about the truth-value of sentences containing these proper 
names (for critical discussion, see Martí forthcoming).  
1.4 Implications of the Variation in Intuitions 
So, evidence suggests that intuitions about the reference of proper names vary within 
and across cultures. Philosophers of language interested in reference need to accom-
modate such variation. Consider the case of names. 
 One option would be to maintain that names refer in the same way in all languages 
and thus infer that variable intuitions are not reliable guides to the reference of names. 
Philosophers of language who adopt this view would reject the method of cases, and 
they in turn owe an account of how the correct theory of reference is to be deter-
mined. 
 Alternatively, philosophers of language interested in reference could maintain that 
intuitions are reliable guides to the semantic properties of names and go on to infer 
that names refer differently in different cultures. If they endorse this second option, 
philosophers of language would need to examine the intuitions of ordinary competent 
speakers empirically, which would lead to a sea-change in their methods and might 
compel them to devise new theories of reference (Machery and Stich forthcoming). 
 A third option would be to insist that some intuitions, but not others (or more 
than others), are reliable guides to the semantic properties of names. In particular, one 
could suggest that academic philosophers, or more generally linguistic experts, have 
more reliable intuitions than others. The burden for this line of argument is justifying 
the claim that the favored group of people or of intuitions is privileged. 
2. Devitt’s Expertise Defense 
2.1 Devitt’s Central-Process Conception of Linguistic Intuitions 
Devitt (2006a, 2006b) draws a contrast between two distinct views about intuitions. 
According to what may be called “the modularist conception of intuitions,” intuitions 
result from a mechanism that is largely encapsulated from people’s beliefs. In this 
case, changes in beliefs would not influence what intuitions people have. The modu-
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larist conception contrasts with “the central-process conception of intuitions,” accord-
ing to which intuitions result from the beliefs people have. In this case, changes in be-
liefs would influence what intuitions people have.  
 For Devitt (2006a, 2006b, 2010), the central-process conception of intuition ap-
plies to lay people’s and to experts’ intuitions about linguistic properties – be they syn-
tactic or semantic. As he puts it, linguistic intuitions are “empirical theory-laden cen-
tral-processor responses to phenomena, differing from many other such responses 
only in being fairly immediate and unreflective, based on little if any conscious reason-
ing” (2006a, 103). When lay people and experts intuit that a grammatical construction 
is unacceptable, their respective beliefs about the rules of English influence their intui-
tions. Similarly, lay people’s as well as experts’ beliefs about reference influence their 
intuitions about the reference of “Gödel” in the situation described by Kripke’s Gödel 
case. 
2.2 Expertise and the Reliability of Intuitions 
Given Devitt’s central-process conception of linguistic intuitions, he unsurprisingly 
holds that the evidential worth of linguistic intuitions depends on the expertise of the 
intuiter. Experts about linguistic matters – viz. linguists and philosophers of language 
– have better theories than non-experts – viz. lay people. They are also better at apply-
ing their theories to particular cases because they know how to identify the relevant 
features of these cases. Thus, the syntactic intuitions of linguists and philosophers of 
language are more reliable than lay people’s intuitions: They are more likely to be true. 
As a result, they provide better evidence about the syntactic properties of various 
grammatical constructions than lay people’s intuitions. The same is true of semantic 
intuitions: In particular, the intuitions about reference of linguists and philosophers of 
language are more reliable and thus provide better evidence about the reference of 
proper names and other kinds of words in actual and possible situations than lay peo-
ple’s intuitions.  
 In this respect, linguistic intuitions are no different from radiologists’ judgments 
about the presence of cancerous nodules on the basis of x-rays or paleoanthropolo-
gists’ judgments about the species bone fragments belong to. In all these cases, expert 
judgments are more reliable than lay people’s judgments, and thus provide better evi-
dence about what is the case. 
2.3 The Expertise Defense 
If experts’ intuitions about reference provide better evidence than lay people’s, one 
should appeal to the former whenever this is possible, weighting them more than the 
latter; it may even be that one should overlook lay intuitions entirely. Devitt endorses 
exactly this line of thought in his response to Machery et al. (2004) and Mallon et al. 
(2009)8: 
                                                     
8 The Expertise Defense is also endorsed in other areas of philosophy (e.g., Kamm 1993; Williamson 
2007, 2011). For discussion, see Weinberg et al. 2010; Machery 2011.  
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[T]he normal competent speaker with even a little education does reflect on linguistic reality just 
as she reflects on many other striking aspects of the world she lives in. And this education will 
usually provide her with the terms and concepts of folk semantics, at least. As a result she is likely 
to be able to judge in a fairly immediate and unreflective way what an expression refers to. (…) 
Still, are these referential intuitions likely to be right? I think we need to be cautious in accepting 
them: semantics is notoriously hard and the folk are a long way from being experts. Still it does 
seem to me that their intuitions about “simple” situations are likely to be right. This having been 
said, we should prefer the intuitions of semanticists, usually philosophers, because they are much 
more expert (which is not to say, very expert!). (2011, 426) 
 Thus, empirical findings concerning lay intuitions about reference should carry lit-
tle weight (if any) in theorizing about reference. Because research on these intuitions 
has so far only examined lay intuitions, its results can be safely overlooked by philoso-
phers of language. Similarly, because the reliability of the judgments about the histori-
cal origins of pot shards depends on the expertise of the intuiters, we treat the judg-
ments made by archaeologists as the relevant evidence to decide whether some pot 
shards are of Sumerian origin, and we are not concerned if lay people’s judgments are 
haphazard. The same point applies to judgments about the authenticity of paintings or 
to the assessment of the aesthetic worth of many pieces of art. In all these cases, we 
tend to dismiss the vagaries of folk judgments on the grounds that they probably re-
flect lay people’s lack of expertise and that expert judgments provide much better evi-
dence about what is the case. 
 The upshot should be clear: If expertise really improves the reliability of the intui-
tions about reference, then the variation in intuitions found in previous work can jus-
tifiably be ignored by philosophers of language. The remainder of this paper will be 
dedicated to casting doubt on the truth of the antecedent of this conditional.  
3. Objections to the Expertise Defense 
In this third section, I will put forward several reasons to doubt that expertise about 
language improves the reliability of the intuitions about reference. In Section 4, I will 
provide some empirical evidence supporting this doubt.  
3.1 Do Philosophers and Linguists have Better Theories about Reference? 
In this article, I will take for granted that there is such a thing as reference (for discus-
sion, see however section 4 of Machery and Stich forthcoming), and that we can have 
better or worse theories about reference. Naturally, there is also such a thing as exper-
tise about language: Linguists know vastly more about language than ordinary people. 
Nothing I will say in the remainder of this article entails a denial of this truism.  
 These caveats having been stated, I can now turn to my first concern with the Ex-
pertise Defense: It is unclear whether the theories of reference developed by linguists 
and philosophers of language are better than lay people’s inchoate views. If they are 
not, then the intuitions about reference of philosophers of language and of linguists 
are unlikely to be more reliable than lay people’s. The reason is that, if philosophers of 
language and linguists do not have better theories of reference, then their epistemic 
advantages over lay people boil down to the following: Philosophers of language and 
linguists are aware that one must explain how words refer; they understand what is at 
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stake in explaining reference; they are well acquainted with the (by hypothesis, poor) 
theories of reference put forward by philosophers and linguists; and so on. It is un-
clear why this kind of advantages would make their intuitions more reliable than lay 
people’s. 
 So, Devitt probably assumes that the theories of reference endorsed by philoso-
phers are better than lay people’s inchoate views about reference. However, first, it 
could certainly be that all our ideas about reference are badly mistaken: After all, for a 
long time, experts’ and lay people’s ideas about the origins of diseases or about the or-
igins of the continents have been erroneous too (to give only two examples). Second, 
there are deep disagreements among philosophers of language about what the right 
theory of reference is (compare, e.g., Devitt 1981 and Jackson 1998), and this lack of 
consensus suggests that the philosophical community has not reached a stage where it 
can be very confident about the truth of its ideas about reference.   
3.2 Does Linguistic and Philosophical Expertise Improve Intuitions? 
However, suppose for the sake of the argument that the theories of reference devel-
oped by philosophers of language and by linguists are better than lay people’s inchoate 
ideas about reference. Even if this is the case, it is still not clear that the expertise of 
linguists and philosophers of language improves the reliability of their intuitions about 
reference.  
 Empirical research has failed to find any robust evidence that linguists’ syntactic in-
tuitions are more reliable than lay people’s (for review and discussion, see Schütze 
1996; Culbertson and Gross 2009; Machery and Stich forthcoming). Of particular in-
terest is the study recently conducted by Culbertson and Gross (2009; for discussion, 
see Devitt 2010; Gross and Culbertson 2011). Participants were presented with 73 
sentences, and they were asked to judge the acceptability of these sentences. Partici-
pants were divided in four groups: participants with extensive knowledge of syntax, 
participants with limited knowledge of syntax, participants with knowledge of cogni-
tive science, but no knowledge of syntax, other participants. Reliability was measured 
indirectly: The intuitions of a first group of participants (e.g., lay people) were judged 
to be less reliable than the intuitions of second group (e.g., graduate students in lin-
guistics) if the members of the first group disagreed more with one another than the 
members of the second group. Consistent with previous studies, Culbertson and 
Gross found that linguistic expertise did not improve reliability. The only thing that 
improved reliability was whether participants had any experience with behavioral ex-
periments: That is, those participants with no knowledge of syntax or of cognitive sci-
ence were less reliable than the other participants.  
 If anything, evidence suggests that the theories linguists endorse can bias their lin-
guistic intuitions (Labov 1975; Schütze 1996). Focusing on syntax, Schütze (1996) has 
reviewed several examples. Consider for instance the alleged ambiguity of why-
questions with an embedded that-clause. Lasnik and Saito (1984) assert that sentences 
such as “Why do you think that he left?” are ambiguous, while Aoun et al. (1987) 
claim that they are not. Unsurprisingly, the ambiguity of why-questions with an em-
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bedded that-clause follows from Lasnik and Saito’s theory, but not from Aoun et al.’s 
theory! 
 What explains this pattern of results – viz. expertise failing to increase the reliabil-
ity of linguistic judgments and occasionally biasing them? Because the psychology of 
linguistic intuitions remains poorly understood, it is difficult to say, but we can per-
haps cast some light on this question by examining the relation between intuitions and 
expertise in other fields. Consider for instance statistics. While there are several com-
peting theories about how to draw statistical inferences from samples, there is no 
doubt that these theories are much better than lay people’s inchoate views on the mat-
ter. Despite the existence of these theories, however, statisticians’ intuitions are not 
more reliable than ordinary people’s intuitions for any moderately complex data set. 
Indeed, this is why statisticians rely on computational procedures to determine what 
can be inferred from data. The failure of statisticians’ expertise to improve their intui-
tions for any moderately complex data set is plausibly due to the fact that the correct 
application of statistical theories to such data sets in order to draw statistical infer-
ences is a process too complex to be done intuitively.  
 More generally, it may often be the case that the scientific theories developed by 
experts can only be applied correctly in slow, analytic, reflective reasoning (possibly 
assisted by various computational procedures). When this is the case, experts’ intui-
tions should not be more reliable than ordinary people’s. Importantly, in the situation 
envisaged here, the failure of expertise to improve the reliability of intuitions is not 
due to their informational encapsulation. The fact that the correct application of com-
plex theories cannot happen intuitively does not mean that intuitions are not influ-
enced by these theories at all (or by other beliefs or by the training and assumptions 
that are common in a given discipline). It just means that this influence does not in-
crease the reliability of experts’ intuitions.  
 To come back to linguists’ intuitions, it might be that something like this story ex-
plains why syntacticians’ intuitions are not more reliable than ordinary people’s, while 
being at times biased by the syntactic theories syntacticians endorse. Syntactic theories 
might be too complex to be correctly applied intuitively, but they might still influence 
syntacticians’ intuitions.  
 The upshot of this discussion is the following one: It is unclear whether philoso-
phers of language and linguists have more reliable intuitions about the reference of 
proper names in actual and possible situations than ordinary people. The current theo-
ries about reference might not even be in the right ballpark, and, even if they are, one 
cannot ipso facto conclude that the intuitions of philosophers of language and of lin-
guists are more reliable than lay people’s. So, what is needed to determine whether lin-
guistic expertise improves the reliability of the intuitions about reference is some em-
pirical evidence.   
4. An Experimental Study of Experts’ Intuitions 
In the last section of this article, I present some new empirical evidence tentatively 
suggesting that the training experts receive in a particular field of linguistics biases 
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their intuitions about the reference of proper names. These findings cast doubt on the 
proposal that expertise about language increases the reliability of these intuitions. 
4.1 Experimental Study 
To examine experts’ intuitions about the reference of proper names, linguists and phi-
losophers of language were recruited by means of the snowball sampling method. A 
recruitment e-mail was sent to hundreds of linguists and philosophers of language in 
the top linguistics departments and research centers all over the world. Linguists and 
philosophers of language were asked to forward this e-mail to their colleagues and 
graduate students. In addition, the call for participation in the study was posted on 
several mailing lists, including the Linguist mailing list. Participants were invited to 
take part to a 10-minute web study. As part of the study, they were presented with the 
Tsu Ch’ung Chih vignette followed by the following question (instead of being asked 
about the truth of “Tsu Ch’ung Chih was a great astronomer”): 
Having read the above story and accepting that it is true, when Ivy uses the name “Tsu Ch’ung 
Chih,” who do you think she is actually talking about: 
(A) The person who is widely believed to have discovered the solstice times, but actually stole 
this discovery and claimed credit for it? 
(B) The person who (unbeknownst to Ivy) really determined the solstice times? 
Participants were also asked how certain they were of their answer on a scale ranging 
from 0 (not sure) to 100 (sure). Finally, participants were presented with a biographic 
questionnaire. As part of this questionnaire, participants were asked whether they were 
working on language, and, if they were, what their area of specialization was. They 
were offered the following options: computational linguistics, discourse analysis, evo-
lution of language, historical linguistics, philosophy of language, phonology and pho-
netics, pragmatics, psycholinguistics and neurolinguistics, semantics, sociolinguistics, 
syntax and morphology, other (if they answered “other”, they were asked to describe 
their area of specialization).9 Participants were allowed to check several of these areas 
of specialization. They were also asked “to describe [their] theoretical perspective on 
language in a few words (e.g., generative grammar, cognitive linguistics influenced by 
Talmy or Lakoff, etc.)” and to “name two or three famous linguists that best exempli-
fy [their] theoretical perspective on language (e.g., Chomsky, Saussure, Whorf, etc.).” 
They were finally asked in what field they received their degree.  
 409 participants took part to this study. Participants who did not identify them-
selves as philosophers of language or as linguists were excluded as were those partici-
pants who had not completed a PhD or were not in a graduate program. Participants’ 
area of specialization was identified by means of their answer to the area-of-
specialization question. Those participants who had given several answers were classi-
fied in one of the areas on the basis of their answer to the question about their theo-
                                                     
9 These options were based on the description of the fields within linguistics found on the website of the 
Linguistic Society of America (http://www.lsadc.org/info/ling-fields.cfm) and on a webpage of the 
Department of Linguistics at UCLA (http://www.linguistics.ucla.edu/programs/lxfield.htm). [Both 
accessed on Dec. 28, 2011] 
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retical perspectives, their answer to the question about the linguists that best exempli-
fy their work, and the field in which they received their degree. Participants who could 
not be unambiguously classified were excluded, resulting in a final sample of 272 par-
ticipants.10 Participants who answered “other” and who described their area of special-
ization were classified as follows: Terminologists were added to the group of linguists 
working on discourse analysis; anthropological linguists were added to the group of 
historical linguists; and linguists working on English as a Second Language were added 
to the group of psycholinguists and neurolinguists. The groups of pragmaticists and of 
linguists working on the evolution of language ended up being empty because partici-
pants who identified themselves as working on pragmatics or on the evolution of lan-
guage typically worked in other fields too and were classified in these fields. In addi-
tion to linguists and philosophers of language, lay people matched for education 
(N=26 out of a sample of 107 participants) were also presented with the Tsu Ch’ung 
Chih case.11   
 Figure 2 reports participants’ answer to the Tsu Ch’ung Chih case as a function of 
their area of specialization. Figure 3 reports their degree of confidence.  While the 
majority of participants in all groups reported Kripkean intuitions, the proportion var-
ied across groups (from 66.7% to 88.6%). Furthermore, on average participants were 
quite confident in their judgments.  
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Figure 2: Proportion of Kripkean Answers 
                                                     
10 47.4 % males; age range: 20-75; mean age: 39; 54 % native speakers of English. 
11 Only participants with at least a Bachelor degree were included in the sample. Participants with an MA 
or a PhD in philosophy were excluded. 53.8 % males; age range: 22-72; mean age: 39.1; 73.1% native 
speakers of English. 
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Figure 3: Confidence 
 To analyze the influence of participants’ disciplinary background on their intuitions 
about the reference of proper names, two groups of experts were formed. Semanti-
cists and philosophers of language were put together because they are likely to have 
read Kripke’s Naming and Necessity and because some research topics are common to 
these two fields (Group 1). Researchers in discourse analysis, historical linguistics, and 
sociolinguistics were put together because they are likely to be particularly sensitive to 
the descriptions associated with proper names (Group 2). Figure 4 reports the propor-
tion of Kripkean answers in these two groups as well as among comparably educated 
lay people (Group 3), and Figure 5 their confidence.12 
 While a majority of participants in the three groups under consideration report 
Kripkean intuitions, the intuitions of these three groups are significantly different 
(χ2(2, N=159)=5.95, p=.051).13 Philosophers and semanticists are more likely to have 
Kripkean intuitions than linguists working in discourse analysis, historical linguistics, 
and sociolinguistics (χ2(1, N=133)=5.97, p=.015).14 The three groups express a similar 
degree of confidence.  
                                                     
12 One may be surprised by the high proportion of Kripkean answers among lay people (77% compared 
to the 55% in Machery et al. 2004). Two factors explain this proportion. First, the question at the end 
of the Tsu Ch’ung Chih vignette follows Sytsma and Livengood’s (2011) formulation, which is 
known to increase the proportion of Kripkean answers among Westerners (74% in Sytsma and Liv-
engood 2011). Second, education somewhat increases the proportion of Kripkean answers. 
13 The results are similar if only linguists and philosophers with a PhD are considered. 
14 The differences between group 1 and group 3 (p=.27) and between group 2 and group 3 (p=.43) were 
not significant (possibly because of the size of the sample of controls (N=26)).  
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Figure 4: Proportion of Kripkean Answers 
 
Figure 5: Confidence 
4.2 Discussion 
It is consistent with expertise improving the reliability of people’s intuitions about ref-
erence that some experts (e.g., some philosophers, or some semanticists, or some his-
torical linguists) or, perhaps, the experts in some fields (e.g., philosophy of language, 
or semantics, or historical linguistics) have better intuitions that other experts or than 
the experts in some other fields since some experts or the experts in some fields might 
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be more expert than other experts or than the experts in other fields. Thus, the im-
provement of the reliability of intuitions by means of expertise is compatible with the 
existence of some variation among linguistic experts or across areas of specialization: 
For instance, historical linguists could have more reliable intuitions than philosophers 
of language. However, what would be evidence against the hypothesis that linguistic 
expertise improves the reliability of the intuitions about reference is an inconsistent in-
fluence of expertise on experts’ intuitions. If expertise really improves the reliability of 
experts’ intuitions, then it should influence their intuitions consistently: That is, all ex-
perts should be either more Kripkean (if reference is really fixed causally-historically) or 
more descriptivist (if reference is really fixed descriptively) than ordinary people. 
 However, the evidence presented above suggests that expertise has an inconsistent 
influence on experts’ intuitions about the reference of the proper name “Tsu Ch’ung 
Chih” in the situation described by the Tsu Ch’ung Chih case. Philosophers of lan-
guage and semanticists, who are likely to have read Naming and Necessity, those linguists 
who are attuned to the descriptions associated with words – viz. terminologists, lin-
guists working on discourse analysis, historical linguists, anthropological linguists, and 
sociolinguists – and comparably educated people have significantly different intui-
tions. Furthermore, philosophers of language and semanticists are also more likely to 
have Kripkean intuitions than comparably educated people, while terminologists, lin-
guists working on discourse analysis, historical linguists, anthropological linguists, and 
sociolinguists are more likely to have descriptivist intuitions than comparably educated 
people (although these last two differences do not reach significance, see footnote 15). 
This inconsistent influence of expertise on intuitions about reference casts doubts on 
whether expertise really improves the reliability of these intuitions.  
 If expertise does not improve the reliability of the intuitions about reference, how 
are we to understand its influence on experts’ intuitions? As we saw in Section 3.2, 
syntacticians’ theoretical commitments can bias their acceptability intuitions: Syntacti-
cians with different theoretical commitments sometimes have different intuitions 
about the acceptability of grammatical constructions. In this case, instead of improv-
ing their reliability, expertise biases experts’ intuitions. It is plausible to interpret the 
influence of experts’ area of specialization on intuitions about reference similarly. In 
different areas of specialization, experts about language (including philosophers of 
language) are taught different theories and learn to approach linguistic phenomena 
with different presuppositions. Far from improving their reliability, this explicit and 
implicit knowledge biases their intuitions about reference. 
 The results reported here undermine the Expertise Defense. If it is not the case 
that expertise improves the reliability of intuitions, then there is little justification for 
holding that experts’ intuitions provide better evidence about the reference of proper 
names in actual and possible situations than lay people’s intuitions (or even that only 
these intuitions provide evidence) and for ignoring the variation in intuitions found in 
recent work.   
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4.3 Objections and Replies 
In this final section, I consider four responses to the line of argument put forward in 
Sections 4.1 and 4.2. One could first respond that the study presented in Section 4.1 
shows that experts agree that in the fictional situation described by the Tsu Ch’ung 
Chih vignette “Tsu Ch’ung Chih” refers to Tsu Ch’ung Chih: In all groups, a large ma-
jority of experts report having Kripkean intuitions. Thus, there is a consensus among 
experts about the reference of proper names in situations similar to Kripke’s Gödel 
case, and it is difficult to see how such a consensus could undermine the Expertise 
Defense – or so the objection goes.  
 This first response fails to address the objection to the Expertise Defense put for-
ward in Sections 4.1 and 4.2. What is at stake is whether expertise about language 
(which is not questioned here) increases the reliability of experts’ intuitions about ref-
erence. To show that it does, one needs to show that experts’ intuitions differ from 
ordinary people’s and that expertise has a consistent effect on experts’ intuitions. That 
most experts in every area of specialization considered in Section 4.1 report Kripkean 
intuitions does not establish either of these facts.  
 A second response to the argument against the Expertise Defense would begin by 
noting that, while all the groups considered above (computational linguistics, semanti-
cists, etc.) have some expertise about language, not every kind of expertise about lan-
guage should be expected to improve the reliability of people’s intuitions about refer-
ence. For instance, there is no reason to expect the expertise of phoneticists and pho-
nologists to improve the reliability of their intuitions about the reference of proper 
names in actual and fictional situations. In contrast to phoneticists or, maybe, to psy-
cholinguists, the expertise of philosophers of language and of semanticists is likely to 
improve the reliability of their intuitions about reference because these researchers are 
concerned with the semantic values of words. As a matter of fact, the objection con-
tinues, both philosophers of language and semanticists are more Kripkean than com-
parably educated lay people, in line with the idea that their expertise improves the reli-
ability of their intuitions.  
 In contrast to the first response, this second response really addresses the argu-
ment against the Expertise Defense. However, there are two (mutually consistent) 
lines of reply to this second objection. First, semanticists have not shown much inter-
est in how proper names acquire their semantic value. Because they probably have not 
thought much about this metasemantic issue, they may not be particularly good at 
identifying the relevant features for determining what a proper name refers to in a fic-
tional situation. For this reason, it is unclear whether we should really expect semanti-
cists’ expertise to improve the reliability of their intuitions about the reference of 
proper names in fictional situations. Second, and more important, there is as much 
reason to expect the expertise of historical linguists, anthropological linguists, and so-
ciolinguists to improve the reliability of their intuitions about reference as to expect 
the expertise of philosophers of language and semanticists to improve the reliability of 
their intuitions. Historical linguists are concerned with how the reference or extension 
of words changes over time, and anthropological linguists are concerned with whether 
words that appear to be approximate translations in different languages (e.g., words 
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for emotions) are coreferential or coextensional. But it turns out that, while philoso-
phers of language and semanticists tend to have more Kripkean intuitions than com-
parably educated people, historical linguists, anthropological linguists, and sociolin-
guists tend to have slightly less Kripkean intuitions (although these differences do not 
reach significance). Expertise makes one group more Kripkean, but another group 
more descriptivist. It would thus seem that even relevant expertise about language does 
not improve the reliability of experts’ intuitions about the reference of proper names 
in actual and possible situations. 
 The third objection pushes the second objection a bit further by asserting that we 
have good reasons to distrust the intuitions of historical linguists, anthropological lin-
guists, and sociolinguists. One could hold for instance that the semantic theories that 
are common in these fields are confused, and that they are thus unlikely to improve 
the reliability of the intuitions about reference. The upshot is that we should only ap-
peal to the intuitions of semanticists and philosophers of language. 
 The rejoinder to this third response can be brief. Historical linguistics, anthropo-
logical linguistics, and sociolinguistics are successful disciplines, and, without a de-
tailed, non-question-begging argument explaining why the theories and practices 
common in these disciplines are less likely to improve the intuitions about reference 
than the theories and practices common in semantics and in the philosophy of lan-
guage, there is no reason to take this response seriously.  
 The fourth response to the argument against the Expertise Defense notes that nei-
ther the answers of historical linguists, anthropological linguists, and sociolinguists nor 
the answers of philosophers of language and semanticists differ significantly from the 
answers given by comparably educated lay people. It concludes that it is a mistake to 
infer from this that expertise has an inconsistent influence on experts’ intuitions. 
 In response, it is worth noting that with a larger sample of control participants the 
differences would plausibly be significant. Furthermore, this is not a response that 
proponents of the Expertise Defense should be happy to make, for it is at odds with 
the assumption that expertise about language improves the reliability of the intuitions 
about reference. 
5. Conclusion 
Lay people’s intuitions about the reference of proper names vary within and across 
cultures, a fact that, my coauthors and I have argued, has significant philosophical im-
plications (Machery et al. 2004, forthcoming b; Mallon et al. 2009). Devitt, Ludwig, 
and others have replied that these empirical results can be dismissed because experts’ 
intuitions provide better evidence about reference than lay people’s. However, theo-
retical and empirical considerations cast doubt on the Expertise Defense. In particular, 
the fact that expertise in different linguistic fields pulls intuitions in opposite direc-
tions – toward descriptivism for sociolinguistics, historical linguistics, and anthropo-
logical linguistics and toward causal-historical theories of reference for semanticists 
and for philosophers of language – casts doubts on the claim that expertise improves 
the reliability of the intuitions about reference and that, as a result, experts’ intuitions 
are to be preferred for evidential purposes.   
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